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Finite Mimicry of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem

by Paul Fjelstad

This article originally appeared in:
Mathematics Magazine
April, 2007

Subject classification(s): Logic and Foundations
Applicable Course(s): 4.6 Logic/Foundations

This paper seeks the minimal structure needed to mimic Gödel's formal system with regard to self-referring sentences, incompleteness, the futility of striving for completeness, and the inability to define the nature of truth.

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