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Game Theory through Examples

Erich Prisner
Publisher: 
Mathematical Association of America
Publication Date: 
2014
Number of Pages: 
308
Format: 
Electronic Book
Series: 
Classroom Resource Materials
Price: 
27.00
ISBN: 
9781614441151
Category: 
Textbook
BLL Rating: 

The Basic Library List Committee suggests that undergraduate mathematics libraries consider this book for acquisition.

[Reviewed by
Joel Haack
, on
01/16/2015
]

Erich Prisner's Game Theory Through Examples is an exemplary contribution to the MAA's series of Classroom Resource Materials. The topics include simultaneous games and sequential games, both zero-sum and non-zero-sum, and with both perfect information and randomness. Mixed strategies for games are discussed relatively late, in chapter 27, but nine example chapters follow, so this topic also is available for exploration. Prisner provides a wealth of example games for students to explore, either individually or in groups, with questions that can take a few minutes to answer to projects that can take a couple of weeks. The electronic format of the text allows easy and timely access to a set of Java applets that allow readers to experience the games being discussed and to a set of Excel spreadsheets that carry out the computations required to analyze the games, so that students need not be bogged down in the mechanical aspects of the subject. Typically, the applets and spreadsheets can be modified by the students so that they can pose questions about variants and explore these on their own.

As Prisner mentions in a helpful Preface, he has included far more material than could be covered in a one-semester course; he provides a helpful guide to the text that displays the relationships among the eight theory chapters (each of which also includes example games), a chapter giving students a brief description of Excel, five history chapters that give the students a sense of the development and relevancy of the ideas, and twenty-four (!) chapters that discuss concrete examples.

Prisner suggests a number of possible audiences for the book, including students in economics, political science, computer science, and mathematics; I believe that the explanations are clear enough, though terse, and the examples rich enough to allow all these groups to enjoy the book. He suggests that his book would be a good secondary text; I agree with this, for if I were teaching from it or using it for independent study, I'd like to have a primary text with more development of the theory and have Prisner's book on hand for concrete examples.

But the principal audience for the text, the one Prisner had in mind, is a general education course in mathematics. The computations in the book are carried out at a pre-calculus level, perhaps even a level of high school algebra, while the level of the ideas and abstractions are appropriate for a college-level audience. It would not fit the particular strictures of a general education mathematics course at my institution, but I can certainly imagine using this text as the basis of an honors seminar with students from a variety of disciplines. And the concrete examples would also assist me in the variety of courses in which I do discuss some topics from game theory (combinatorics, linear programming, the history of mathematics, and graduate courses for middle grades and secondary teachers). My students will particularly enjoy sequential games reminiscent of TV quiz shows, Deal or No Deal, "Waiting for Mr. Perfect," spending money for advertising in elections (especially here in Iowa!), and the simpler variants of poker.

There are a small number of errors in the text, few of which will cause students any difficulty. Exceptions could be on page 201, where the most frequent strategy is said to be scissors rather than paper, and on page 206, where the lines drawn in Figure 27.1 should be described as running from \((0,A_{2,i})\) to \((1, A_{1,i})\) rather than from \((0, A_{1,i})\) to \((1, A_{2,i})\). 

Throughout the book, I am impressed by Prisner's passion for the topics presented. He also provides thoughtful and intelligent commentary on the value of considering psychological and social utility in payoffs (rather than only money), the certainty that not all humans are rational actors in every situation, and the morality of using game theory in settings of wars and duels. It is clear that he has taught this material and listened to his students.

To summarize, this book would be a valuable resource of examples for any instructor teaching topics from game theory. It would also be a good text for a general education course that seeks to engage the students in exploratory projects in this aspect of applied mathematics.


Joel Haack is Professor of Mathematics at the University of Northern Iowa.

  • Preface
  • Chapter 1 Theory 1: Introduction
    • 1.1 What’s a Game?
    • 1.2 Game, Play, Move: Some Definitions
    • 1.3 Classification of Games
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 2 Theory 2: Simultaneous Games
    • 2.1 Normal Form---Bimatrix Description
      • 2.1.1 Two Players
      • 2.1.2 Two Players, Zero-sum
      • 2.1.3 Three or More Players
      • 2.1.4 Symmetric Games
    • 2.2 Which Option to Choose
      • 2.2.1 Maximin Move and Security Level
      • 2.2.2 Dominated Moves
      • 2.2.3 Best Response
        Best Response for Three Players
      • 2.2.4 Nash Equilibria
    • 2.3 Additional Topics
      • 2.3.1 Best Response Digraphs
        Condensed Best Response Digraphs for Symmetric Games
      • 2.3.2 2-Player Zero-sum Symmetric Games
        Proof
    • Exercises
    • Project 1: Reacting fast or slow
  • Chapter 3 Example: Selecting a Class
    • 3.1 Three Players, Two Classes
      • 3.1.1 “I like you both”
        Adam and Beth prefer French and Carl prefers Italian
        Other class preferences
      • 3.1.2 Disliking the Rival Adam and Beth prefer French and Carl prefers Italian
        Adam and Carl prefer French and Beth prefers Italian
        The other cases
      • 3.1.3 Outsider
    • 3.2 Larger Cases
    • 3.3 Assumptions
    • Exercises
    • Project 2
    • Project 3
    • Project 4
  • Chapter 4 Example: Doctor Location Games
    • 4.1 Doctor Location
      • 4.1.1 An Example Graph
      • 4.1.2 No (Pure) Nash Equilibrium?
      • 4.1.3 How Good are the Nash Equilibria for the Public?
    • 4.2 Trees
    • 4.3 More than one Office (optional)
    • Exercises
    • Project 5: Doctor location on MOPs
    • Project 6
    • Project 7
  • Chapter 5 Example: Restaurant Location Games
    • 5.1 A First Graph
    • 5.2 A Second Graph
    • 5.3 Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria
    • 5.4 More than one Restaurant (optional)
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 6 Using Excel
    • 6.1 Spreadsheet Programs like Excel
    • 6.2 Two-Person Simultaneous Games
    • 6.3 Three-Person Simultaneous Games
    • Exercises
    • Project 8: Simultaneous Quatro-Uno
    • Project 9: Restaurant Location Games
    • Project 10: 5 Knights
    • Project 11: 5 Cardinals
  • Chapter 7 Example: Election I
    • 7.1 First Example
    • 7.2 Second Example
    • 7.3 The General Model
    • 7.4 Third Example
    • 7.5 The Eight Cases
    • 7.6 Voting Power Indices (optional)
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 8 Theory 3: Sequential Games I: Perfect Information and no Randomness
    • 8.1 Extensive Form: Game Tree and Game Digraph
    • 8.2 Analyzing the Game: Backward Induction
      • 8.2.1 Finite Games
      • 8.2.2 The Procedure
      • 8.2.3 Zermelo’s Theorem
    • 8.3 Additional Topics
      • 8.3.1 Reality Check
      • 8.3.2 Playing it Safe---Guaranteed Payoffs
      • 8.3.3 Two-person Zero-sum Games
      • 8.3.4 Breaking Ties
      • 8.3.5 Existing Games
      • 8.3.6 Greedy Strategies
    • Exercises
    • Project 12: TAKE SOME
    • Project 13: WHO’s NEXT(\(n\))
    • Project 14: LISA’s GAME
    • Project 15: 2-AUCTION
    • Project 16: 3-AUCTION
  • Chapter 9 Example: Dividing A Few Items I
    • 9.1 Greedy Strategy
    • 9.2 Backward Induction
      • 9.2.1 Game Tree
      • 9.2.2 Game Digraph
      • 9.2.3 Example: Game Digraph for ABBAB
    • 9.3 An Abbreviated Analysis
      • 9.3.1 Why it Matters: Complexity (optional)
    • 9.4 Bottom-Up Analysis
    • 9.5 Interdependencies between the Items (optional)
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 10 Example: Shubik Auction I
    • Exercises
    • Project 17: SHUBIK AUCTION
  • Chapter 11 Example: Sequential Doctor and Restaurant Location
    • 11.1 General Observations for Symmetric Games
    • 11.2 Doctor Location
    • 11.3 Constant-Sum Games
    • 11.4 Restaurant Location
    • 11.5 Nash Equilibria and First Mover Advantage for Symmetric Games
    • Exercises
    • Project 18
    • Project 19: Hostile versus Friendly Play
  • Chapter 12 Theory 4: Probability
    • 12.1 Terminology
    • 12.2 Computing Probabilities
      • 12.2.1 Equally Likely Simple Events
      • 12.2.2 Simple Events not Equally Likely
    • 12.3 Expected Value
    • 12.4 Multistep Experiments
      • 12.4.1 Probability Trees
      • 12.4.2 Conditional Probabilities
      • 12.4.3 Probability Digraphs
    • 12.5 Randomness in Simultaneous Games
    • 12.6 Counting without Counting
    • Exercises
    • Project 20: Tennis
    • Project 21: Final Exam
  • Chapter 13 France 1654
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 14 Example: DMA Soccer I
    • 14.1 1-Round 2-Step Experiment for Given Player Distributions
    • 14.2 Expected Goal Difference for the One-Round Game
    • 14.3 3-Rounds Experiment for Given Player Distributions
    • 14.4 Static Three-round Game
    • 14.5 Static Nine-round DMA Soccer
    • Exercises
    • Project 22: DMA6* Soccer
    • Project 23: DMA7* Soccer
  • Chapter 15 Example: Dividing A Few Items II
    • 15.1 Goals of Fairness and Efficiency
      • 15.1.1 Fairness
      • 15.1.2 Efficiency
      • 15.1.3 Three Additional Features
      • 15.1.4 Mechanism Design
    • 15.2 Some Games
      • 15.2.1 Selecting one by one Games
      • 15.2.2 Cut and Choose
      • 15.2.3 Random and Exchange
    • 15.3 Examples
    • 15.4 Comparison of the Games for Seven Items and Complete Information
      • 15.4.1 Opposing or Similar Preferences
    • 15.5 Incomplete Information
    • Exercises
    • Project 24: Dividing five items A
    • Project 25: Dividing five items B
  • Chapter 16 Theory 5: Sequential Games with Randomness
    • 16.1 Extensive Form Extended
    • 16.2 Analyzing the Game: Backward Induction again
    • 16.3 Decision Theory: Alone against Nature
    • Exercises
    • Project 26: Job Interviews
    • Project 27: 5 Envelopes
    • Project 28: Oh-No or Oh-No6
    • Project 29: \(3 \times 4\) version of Polyomino REC THE SQUARE with randomness
  • Chapter 17 Example: Sequential Quiz Show I
    • 17.1 Candidates with Little Knowledge
      • 17.1.1 More May be Less
    • 17.2 One Candidate Knows More
      • 17.2.1 Cindy Knows one Answer to be False
    • Exercises
    • Project 30: SEQUENTIAL QUIZ SHOW, clever Ann
    • Project 31: SEQUENTIAL QUIZ SHOW, clever Beth
  • Chapter 18 Las Vegas 1962
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 19 Example: Mini Blackjack and Card Counting
    • 19.1 The Basic Game
    • 19.2 Playing against the House
      • 19.2.1 How Likely are the Distributions?
      • 19.2.2 Betting High and Low
      • 19.2.3 Reshuffling
    • Exercises
    • Project 32: 8 ROUNDS BLACK OR WHITE
    • Project 33: \(x\) ROUNDS RED, GREEN, OR BLUE
    • Project 34: MINI BLACKJACK
  • Chapter 20 Example: Duel
    • 20.1 One Bullet
      • 20.1.1 Analysis of One-bullet Variants with Increasing Probabilities without Computer Help
      • 20.1.2 Analysis of DUEL(\(1,1|m, 2m, 3m, \ldots \))
    • 20.2 Two or more Bullets
      • 20.2.1 A few Cases of DUEL(\(2,2|m, 2m, 3m,\ldots \))
    • Exercises
    • Project 35: Drunk Adam
    • Project 36: How more dangerous weapons affect the state budget and the health of citizens
    • Project 37: Selecting \(m\) between 0.04 and 0.13
    • Project 38: What duels are best for society?
  • Chapter 21 Santa Monica in the 50s
  • Chapter 22 Theory 6: Extensive Form of General Games
    • 22.1 Extensive Form and Information Sets
    • 22.2 No Backward Induction for Imperfect Information
    • 22.3 Subgames
    • 22.4 Multi-round Games
    • 22.5 Why Trees for Imperfect Information?
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 23 Example: Shubik Auction II
    • 23.1 Possible Sudden End
    • 23.2 Imperfect and Incomplete Information
    • 23.3 The Auctioneer Enters the Game (optional)
    • Exercises
    • Project 39
    • Project 40
    • Project 41: SHUBIK AUCTION(\(45, 35, 6, p\))
    • Project 42: SHUBIK AUCTION(\(A, B, C, n, p\))
  • Chapter 24 Theory 7: Normal Form and Strategies
    • 24.1 Pure Strategies
      • 24.1.1 Reduced Pure Strategies
    • 24.2 Normal Form
    • 24.3 Using Tools from Simultaneous Games for the Normal Form
    • 24.4 Subgame Perfectness
    • 24.5 Special Case of Sequential Games with Perfect Information
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 25 Example: VNM POKER and KUHN POKER
    • 25.1 Description
    • 25.2 VNM POKER
    • 25.3 KUHN POKER
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 26 Example: Waiting for Mr. Perfect
    • 26.1 The Last Round
    • 26.2 The Eight Pure Strategies
    • 26.3 Computing the Payoffs
    • 26.4 Domination
    • 26.5 The Reduced Normal Forms in the Three Cases
      • 26.5.1 The Case \(\mathbf p_2+2\mathbf p_3 < 1 \)
      • 26.5.2 The Case \(\mathbf p_2+2\mathbf p_3 > 1 \)
      • 26.5.3 The Case \(\mathbf p_2+2\mathbf p_3 = 1 \)
    • Project 43
    • Project 44
    • Project 45
    • Project 46
    • Project 47
    • Project 48
  • Chapter 27 Theory 8: Mixed Strategies
    • 27.1 Mixed Strategies
      • 27.1.1 Best Response
      • 27.1.2 Brown’s Fictitious Play
      • 27.1.3 Mixed Maximin Strategy, Mixed Security Level, and Linear Programs
    • 27.2 Mixed Nash Equilibria
      • 27.2.1 Two-player Zero-sum Games
      • 27.2.2 Non-Zero-sum Games
    • 27.3 Computing Mixed Nash Equilibria
      • 27.3.1 Small Two-player Zero-sum Games (optional)
        \(2 \times n\) zero-sum games
        \(3 \times n\) zero-sum games
      • 27.3.2 Solving Small non Zero-sum Two-player Games by Solving Equations (optional)
    • Exercises
    • Project 49: Balanced 3-spinner duel with five options
    • Project 50: Balanced 3-spinner duel
    • Project 51: COLONEL BLOTTO(4, 9, 9)
    • Project 52: Iterated COLONEL BLOTTO
    • Project 53: Simultaneous Quatro-Uno
    • Project 54
    • Project 55: 4-round Waiting for Mr. Perfect
  • Chapter 28 Princeton in 1950
  • Chapter 29 Example: Airport Shuttle
    • 29.1 The Simple Model
      • 29.1.1 To the Airport
      • 29.1.2 From the Airport
      • 29.1.3 Combining Both
    • 29.2 Impatient Customers
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 30 Example: Election II
    • 30.1 Left Over from Election I
    • 30.2 More Effort into Large Districts
    • 30.3 Defend Where Ahead or Attack Where Weak?
    • 30.4 Is Larger Better?
    • 30.5 ELECTION(\(7,8,13|-1,-1,2|x,x)\)
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 31 Example: VNM POKER(\(2, r, m, n\))
    • 31.1 The Case \( \frac{n}{m} \ge 2 - \frac1r \)
    • 31.2 Best Responses
    • 31.3 Reading the Opponent (optional)
    • 31.4 Mixed Nash Equilibrium for \( \frac{n}{m} \le 2- \frac1r \)
    • 31.5 Small Changes in the Parameters
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 32 Theory 9: Behavioral Strategies
    • 32.1 Behavioral versus Mixed Strategies
      • 32.1.1 Calculating Mixed Strategies from Behavioral Strategies
      • 32.1.2 Calculating Behavioral Strategies from Mixed Strategies for a Game Tree with Perfect Recall
      • 32.1.3 Kuhn’s Theorem
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 33 Example: Multiple-Round Chicken
    • 33.1 Ordinary Chicken
    • 33.2 Two-round Chicken
      • 33.2.1 Generalized Backward Induction, using the Extensive Form
      • 33.2.2 Working with the Normal Form
      • 33.2.3 Connections between the two Approaches
    • 33.3 Three-round Chicken
    • Exercises
    • Project 56
    • Project 57
    • Project 58
  • Chapter 34 Example: DMA Soccer II
    • 34.1 Multi-round Simultaneous Games
    • 34.2 Information Sets and Moves
    • 34.3 The Optimal Third Move in Selected Cases
      • 34.3.1 A Detailed Example: (2, 2) versus (3, 1)
        Ann is one Goal Behind
        Other Goal Differences
      • 34.3.2 A Second Example: (1, 3) versus (2, 2)
    • 34.4 The Optimal Second Move for Seven Positions
    • 34.5 Couldn’t We Analyze the Whole Game?
    • 34.6 How Good a Model is it?
  • Chapter 35 Example: Sequential Quiz Show II
    • 35.1 Fixed Coalitions
      • 35.1.1 Ann and Cindy Form a Coalition
      • 35.1.2 Ann and Beth Form a Coalition
      • 35.1.3 Beth and Cindy Form a Coalition
    • 35.2 Which Coalition Will Form?
      • 35.2.1 Fixed 50:50 Split
        \(n=10\), \(m=4\)
        \(\boldsymbol n=12 \), \(\boldsymbol m=4 \)
    • 35.3 Another Variant: Split can be Negotiated
      \(n=12\), \(m=4\)
      \(n=10\), \(m=4\)
    • 35.4 The Grand Coalition
      • 35.4.1 The Core
      • 35.4.2 The Shapley Value
    • Exercises
    • Project 59
  • Chapter 36 Example: VNM POKER(4, 4, 3, 5)
    • 36.1 Mixed Nash Equilibria
    • 36.2 Performance of Pure Strategies against the Mixed Nash Equilibria
  • Chapter 37 Example: KUHN POKER(3, 4, 2, 3)
    • 37.1 From Behavioral Strategies to Mixed Strategies to Expectations
    • 37.2 From Mixed Strategies to Behavioral Strategies
    • Exercises
  • Chapter 38 Example: End-of-Semester Poker Tournament
    • 38.1 Expectations
    • 38.2 Odds
      • 38.2.1 Many Rounds
    • 38.3 The Favorite in Knockout Tournaments
    • 38.4 Similarity of the DNA (optional)
    • 38.5 How to Create your own Tournament
    • Exercises
    • Project 60
    • Project 61
    • Project 62
  • Chapter 39 Stockholm 1994
  • Bibliography
  • Index