Preface
Contributors
Part I. Zero-Sum Game Theory
D. Rosenberg, E. Solan, and N. Vieille: Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring
S.S. Kumkov and V.S. Patsko: Level Sweeping of the Value Function in Linear Differential Games
V.P. Serov: Optimal Feedback in a Dynamic Game of Generalized Shortest Path
Part II. Pursuit-Evasion Games
J. Shinar and V.Y. Glizer: New Approach to Improve the Accuracy in Delayed Information Pursuit-Evasion Games
A.A. Chikrii: Game Problems for Systems with Fractional Derivatives of Arbitrary Order
N.N. Petrov and D.A. Vagin: On Two Problems of Group Pursuit
Part III. Games of Coalitions
L.A. Petrosjan: Cooperative Stochastic Games
Y. Funaki and T. Yamato: The Uniqueness of a Reduced Game in a Characterization of the Core in Terms of Consistency
J. Scheffran: The Formation of Adaptive Coalitions
T.E.S. Raghavan and P. Sudhölter: On Assignment Games
Part IV. New Concepts of Equilibrium
A. Vasin: The Folk Theorems in the Framework of Evolution and Cooperation
J. Morgan and F. Patrone: Stackelberg Problems: Subgame Perfect Equilibria via Tikhonov Regularization
N. Hidano and S. Muto: Extended Self, Game, and Conflict Resolution
Part V. Applications to Energy/Environment Economics
A. Kryazhimskii, O. Nikonov, and Y. Minullin: Game of Timing in Gas Pipeline Projects Competition: Simulation Software and Generalized Equilibrium Solutions
R. McKelvey and P.V. Golubtsov: The Effects of Incomplete Information in Stochastic Common-Stock Harvesting Games
A. Haurie, F. Moresino, and L. Viguier: A Two-Level Differential Game of International Emissions Trading
A. Haurie: A Stochastic Multigeneration Game for Global Climate Change Impact Assessment
Part VI. Management Science Applications
P. Bernhard, M. El Farouq, and S. Thiery: An Impulsive Differential Game Arising in Finance with Interesting Singularities
S. Jørgensen, S. Taboubi, and G. Zaccour: Incentives for Retailer Promotion in a Marketing Channel
A. Suzuki and S. Muto: Farsighted Behavior Leads to Efficiency in Duopoly Markets
T.E.S. Raghavan: A Stochastic Game Model of Tax Evasion